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A Remedy for Online Exposure: Recognizing the
Public-Disclosure Tort in North Carolina
ABSTRACT
North Carolina is one of only a few jurisdictions that does not recognize
the tort of public disclosure of private facts—a civil remedy that protects
against the offensive and unauthorized publication of private information
that is not of legitimate public concern. The absence of this tort has
created a gap in privacy protection in the state that is increasingly
problematic with the rise of revenge porn and other online injuries made
possible by the widespread use of the Internet and online social networking
sites. This Comment specifically explores how recognition of the tort of
public disclosure of private facts in North Carolina would give victims of
revenge porn a viable civil remedy and help close the state’s existing
privacy gap.
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INTRODUCTION
North Carolina’s failure to recognize the tort of public disclosure of
private facts1 leaves a gap in privacy protection for North Carolina
citizens.2 This lack of protection is increasingly problematic with the rise
of “revenge porn,” a practice where sexually explicit images or videos are
disclosed online without the consent of the pictured individual.3
The story of Holly Jacobs illustrates the growing problem of revenge
porn. In 2009, Jacobs broke up with her boyfriend of several years.4
During the course of the relationship, Jacobs sent her boyfriend intimate
photos and videos, fully trusting that he would keep them private.5 After
their breakup, her then ex-boyfriend posted several of the photos and a
video on the Internet without her permission, and these images quickly
went viral.6 He also posted Jacobs’s full name, e-mail address, job title,
and specific details of where she worked and how far along she was in her

1. This tort primarily addresses the harm that one suffers to his reputation when
private information is unreasonably disclosed to the public. The tort offers valuable
protection for the reputational harms not covered by defamation because of the veracity of
the disclosed facts. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398 (1960)
(noting that this tort is an “extension of defamation,” remedying serious harm that would
otherwise not be actionable).
2. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting the public disclosure of
private facts as a cause of action in North Carolina).
3. This terminology was used by the Criminal Court of the City of New York. See
People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 638, at *1 n.1 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. Feb. 18, 2014); see also Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression:
Legislative Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 678–79 (2014) (providing alternative
definitions and examples of revenge porn).
4. Beth Stebner, “I’m Tired of Hiding”: Revenge-Porn Victim Speaks Out Over Her
Abuse After She Claims Ex Posted Explicit Photos of Her Online, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 3,
2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/revenge-porn-victim-speaksarticle-1.1334147.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Ph.D. program.7 Jacobs spent the next three years trying to control the
damage.8 She hired lawyers to send her ex-boyfriend letters, pleaded with
police and the FBI to press charges, and hired a specialist to help her take
down the materials.9 Because of the constant online harassment, she left
her job and changed her name.10
Unfortunately, Jacobs is part of an ever-increasing group of victims
who are continually subjected to humiliation and cyber-harassment after
ex-partners publish and distribute their private images online.11 For
example, on February 11, 2014, almost seventy nude and sexual images of
North Carolina high school students were published on Twitter and
Instagram.12 Many of these images were privately sent to a boyfriend or
girlfriend, but were subsequently leaked to other students, who then posted
them on Instagram.13 These images quickly circulated online, and the State
Bureau of Investigation is now looking into similar instances in nine North
Carolina counties.14 The people responsible for these disclosures may face
criminal charges,15 but, as this Comment explains, there are no civil

7. Holly Jacobs, A Message from Our Founder: Dr. Holly Jacobs, CYBER C.R.
INITIATIVE (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.cybercivilrights.org/a_message_from_our_founder_
dr_holly_jacobs.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Stebner, supra note 4. After becoming a victim of revenge porn, Dr. Holly Jacobs
founded the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative to raise awareness about revenge porn and to strive
for its elimination. See Jacobs, supra note 7.
11. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing
the harm suffered by Cecilia Barnes after her ex-boyfriend posted nude photos of Barnes,
along with her personal information, online); Lorelei Laird, Striking Back at Revenge Porn:
Victims Are Taking on Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 2013, at 45, 45–46 (describing how victims like Holly Toups and Rebekah Wells have
spoken out about suffering from involuntary pornography); Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws
to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-to-end-online-revenge-posts.html?_r=0 (recounting the story
of revenge-porn victim Marianna Taschinger).
12. SBI Investigates 15 Instagram Accounts Linked to Nude Photos of Wake Co. Teens,
WSAV (last updated May 6, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.wsav.com/story/25307973/sbigot-warrant-for-15-accounts-in-photo-probe.
13. Rowan Co. Student Accused of Posting Nude Photo, WNCN (last updated Mar. 14,
2014, 6:47 PM), http://www.wncn.com/story/24856133/rowan-county-student-accused-ofposting-nude-photo.
14. Investigation into Nude Teen Photos Spreads to More NC Counties, WFLA (Mar.
12, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://www.wfla.com/story/24829216/investigation-into-nude-teenphotos-spreads-to-more-nc-counties.
15. Police could bring second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and cyberbullying
charges. See Rowan Co. Student, supra note 13; SBI Investigates, supra note 12.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 6

422

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:419

remedies available in North Carolina to directly address the harm suffered
by these victims.16
The experience shared by Jacobs and the North Carolina teenagers is
increasingly common. Surveys later conducted by Jacobs reveal that “over
half (53.3%) of heterosexual respondents had shared a nude photo with
someone else, and nearly three-quarters (74.8%) of LGBT (lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender) respondents had done so.”17 Statistics reveal
similar patterns among teenagers and young adults. One study revealed
that 44% of teenage males viewed at least one nude photo of a female
classmate.18 The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned
Pregnancy found that 20% of teenagers between the ages of thirteen and
nineteen had sent or posted sexual images or videos of themselves.19 The
rate for young adults between ages twenty and twenty-six is even higher, at
33%.20
The nonconsensual distribution of sexual images and videos is also on
the rise. Revenge-porn sites are increasingly common, making it easy for
individuals to post explicit images or videos on the web.21 Jacobs’s
research found that 22.1% of heterosexual respondents, and 23.3% of
LGBT respondents, had been the victims of some form of nonconsensual

16. As of the date of this publication, the North Carolina General Assembly is
considering a bill that would address many of these concerns, but it is unclear whether that
bill will ever become law.
See H.B. 792, 2015 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2015),
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H792v2.pdf. In its current form, the
bill would criminalize acts of revenge porn and would even provide a civil action for its
victims. See id. (proposing amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A (2013)). Passing
this bill would be a large step in the right direction for filling the current gap in privacy
protections in North Carolina, and serves as an indication that the precedent established by
Hall v. Post should be reconsidered.
17. Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2014) (first citing Email from Holly Jacobs to Derek E. Bambauer (June 28, 2013); then citing Holly Jacobs, An
Examination of Psychological Meaningfulness, Safety, and Availability as the Underlying
Mechanisms Linking Job Features and Personal Characteristics to Work Engagement (June
5, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida International University),
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2023&context=etd).
18. Alexandra Marks, Charges Against “Sexting” Teenagers Highlight Legal Gaps,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/ResponsibleTech/2009/0330/charges-against-sexting-teenagers-highlight-legal-gaps.
19. Julie Baumgardner, Teen Pregnancy Prevention, FIRST THINGS FIRST, http://
firstthings.org/teen-pregnancy-prevention-1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
20. Id.
21. Memphis Barker, “Revenge Porn” Is No Longer a Niche Activity Which Victimises
Only Celebrities—The Law Must Intervene, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 2013), http://
www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-no-longer-a-niche-activity-which
-victimises-only-celebrities--the-law-must-intervene-8622574.html.
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distribution.22 People increasingly share nude or sexually explicit photos or
videos with their partners. And those partners increasingly break that trust
by sharing the photos or videos online.
Victims of revenge porn are susceptible to a number of harms.23 In
some cases, victims have “lost jobs, been forced to change schools,
changed their names, and have been subjected to real-life stalking and
harassment because of the actions of those who posted and distributed their
images.”24 Some victims have gone as far as committing suicide.25 It is
common for victims to also experience a lost sense of security, a loss of
personal dignity, feelings of shame in their dealings with family and
friends, and challenges in keeping or securing future romantic
relationships.26
In most states,27 victims of revenge porn can sue the individual who
uploads sexually explicit content under the tort of public disclosure of

22. Bambauer, supra note 17, at 2027–28.
23. Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn Edition,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/
adventures-in-victim-blaming-revenge-porn-edition.html.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize an invasion-of-privacy
action for the public disclosure of private facts. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 828
(Ala. 1994); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Alaska 1989);
Rutledge v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 715 P.2d 1243, 1245–46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Dunlap
v. McCarty, 678 S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (Ark. 1984); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994); Lindemuth v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 765 P.2d 1057,
1059 (Colo. App. 1988); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317,
1329 (Conn. 1982); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1349 (Del. 1992); Wolf v. Regardie,
553 A.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. 1989); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377
(Fla. 1989); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994); Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Haw. 1994); Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587
P.2d 829, 832–33 (Idaho 1978); Beverly v. Reinert, 606 N.E.2d 621, 624–25 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979);
Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256–57 (Kan. 1985); Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co.,
415 S.W.2d 582, 584–85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So.
2d 1386, 1388–90 (La. 1979); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me.
1991); Arroyo v. Rosen, 648 A.2d 1074, 1080–81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Bratt v. Int’l
Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 136–38 (Mass. 1984); Beaumont v. Brown, 257
N.W.2d 522, 531–32 (Mich. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v. Bd. of Educ.,
565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn.
1998); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 381–82 (Miss. 1990); Childs v. Williams, 825
S.W.2d 4, 7–8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); State Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 886 P.2d 954,
957–58 (Mont. 1995); Montesano v. Donrey Media Grp., 668 P.2d 1081, 1084–85 (Nev.
1983); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 240–41 (N.H. 1964); Gallo v. Princeton
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private facts (the public-disclosure tort).28 Because section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act29 immunizes web hosts and other interactive
computer services from most third-party tort liability, the tort provides
victims with a civil remedy against the uploader for the publication of their
private, but true, information.30 This remedy is not available to victims of
revenge porn in North Carolina.
With the rise of revenge porn, the time is ripe for North Carolina to
reconsider the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s 1988 decision in Hall v.
Post, which withheld privacy protections from citizens offered by the
public-disclosure tort.31 This Comment makes the case for recognition of
Univ., 656 A.2d 1267, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Moore v. Sun Publ’g Corp.,
881 P.2d 735, 743 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994); Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 782 (Okla. 1989); Anderson v. Fisher
Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 807–09 (Or. 1986); Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 331 A.2d 424,
430–31 (Pa. 1975); Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 607, 610 (S.C.
1981); Dunn v. Moto Photo, Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 754–55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); StarTelegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473–74 (Tex. 1995); Lemnah v. Am. Breeders
Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d 700, 703–04 (Vt. 1984); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 253–54
(Wash. 1978); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 81–86 (W. Va. 1984);
Hillman v. Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 919–20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the privacy tort in 1909. See Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 109 (1909), superseded by statute, Act of May 16, 1980, ch. 403,
1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 1565 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (2012)). All four
branches of the privacy tort are now codified in Rhode Island. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-1-28.1.
Four states, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, have suggested in
related cases that they might recognize the tort of public disclosure of private facts. See
Tehven v. Job Serv. N.D., 488 N.W.2d 48, 51 (N.D. 1992); Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d
806, 808–09 (S.D. 1979); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563–64 (Utah 1988); Houghton v.
Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1055–56 (Wyo. 1994).
Only four states other than North Carolina, Indiana, Nebraska, New York, and
Virginia, have expressly rejected an invasion of privacy action for the public disclosure of
private facts. See, e.g., Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977); Doe v.
Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997); Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73
N.W.2d 803, 806–07 (Neb. 1955); Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y.
1993) (acknowledging, however, that New York recognizes a right to privacy by statute).
28. See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 434 n.60 (2014).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
30. Id.; see also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010). Anupam Chander argues for increased use
of the public-disclosure tort to combat the rise of revenge porn. See Anupam Chander,
Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY,
AND REPUTATION 124, 129–33 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
31. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. 1988).
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this tort in four parts. Part I offers background, discussing Hall v. Post and
the court’s reasons for rejecting the public-disclosure tort. Part II illustrates
North Carolina’s gap in privacy protection and why recognition of the tort
would help fill the gap. Part III recommends the manner in which North
Carolina should adopt and apply the public-disclosure tort to address
revenge porn and other digital injuries. Finally, Part IV addresses the First
Amendment concerns associated with recognition of the tort.
I.

HALL V. POST AND THE REJECTION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
OF PRIVATE FACTS

The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the public disclosure of
private facts as a cause of action in its 1988 decision, Hall v. Post.32 The
plaintiffs in the case—Susie Hall and her adoptive mother, Mary Hall—
sued the Salisbury Post for publishing two separate articles.33 The first
article concerned Lee and Aledith Gottschalk’s search for Aledith’s
daughter, whom she had abandoned seventeen years prior.34 The article
described Aledith’s former marriage to a carnival barker, the birth of their
daughter, and the abandonment of the child.35
After the Salisbury Post published the first article, the Gottschalks
received calls at their motel informing them that the child described was
plaintiff Susie Hall, and providing her whereabouts.36 The Salisbury Post
subsequently published a second article identifying the child as Susie Hall
and her adoptive mother as Mary Hall.37 This article also described the
details and emotions of a telephone conversation between the Gottschalks
and Susie Hall.38 The Halls alleged that the second publication had caused
them to flee their home to avoid public attention and to seek and receive
psychiatric treatment for the emotional and mental distress caused by the
incident.39
Without specifically addressing the facts of the case, the court
continued the trend it had set when it rejected the tort of false light a few
years earlier40 by similarly rejecting public disclosure of private facts.41
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 714.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984).
Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 717.
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The court outlined two primary reasons for rejecting the cause of action.
First, it found the public disclosure of private facts to be “constitutionally
suspect” because it added to the tension between tort law and the First
Amendment.42 Second, it believed recognition of public disclosure of
private facts would duplicate other causes of action, such as the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.43
Justice Frye, in a concurring opinion, argued that the plaintiffs should
not recover for public disclosure of private facts because the information
was of legitimate public concern, but he disagreed with the court’s decision
to totally deny recognition of the tort.44 Justice Frye acknowledged that
courts have struggled with the tension between the freedom of the press to
disseminate information to the public and an individual’s right to privacy.45
Nonetheless, he emphasized that “neither the constitutional right of
freedom of the press nor the right to be free from publicity [were]
absolute.”46 Justice Frye concluded that the resolution of the conflicting
rights lies in the “application of a ‘newsworthiness’ or ‘public interest’
standard in determining what publications are constitutionally privileged
and what publications are actionable.”47
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision not to recognize the
public-disclosure tort was exceptional.48 The court granted far more
42. Id. at 716.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 717–18 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice Frye wrote:
I do not accept the notion that the tension already existing between the first
amendment and the law of torts requires the non-recognition of a legitimate claim
by a non-public figure against a media defendant for wrongfully publishing highly
offensive private facts which are not of legitimate concern to the public.
Id. at 717.
45. Id. at 719 (first citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); then citing
Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); then citing Virgil v. Time, Inc.,
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); then citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34
(Cal. 1971), overruled on other grounds by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d
552, 560 (Cal. 2004); and then citing Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ’g Co., 326 So. 2d 471
(Miss. 1976)).
46. Id. at 719.
47. Id. at 720 (quoting Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d,
372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988)).
48. See, e.g., Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Neb. 1955)
(deferring to the legislature to decide whether a private-facts claim should be recognized);
Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (N.Y. 1982) (noting that, assuming
privacy actions were recognized, the publication of the plaintiff’s photograph in an article
about middle-class African Americans did not support a claim because “an inability to
vindicate a personal predelection [sic] for greater privacy may be part of the price every
person must be prepared to pay for a society in which information and opinion flow
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sweeping protection to truthful speech than the Supreme Court of the
United States has held the Constitution to require.49 In fact, one year after
Hall, the Supreme Court of the United States cautioned against such
sweeping decisions: “We continue to believe that the sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between the First
Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”50
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in Hall was sweeping, leaving North
Carolina with a rule that was as unnecessary as it was unprecedented. Only
four other states have declined to recognize the public-disclosure tort.51
A lot has changed since the state’s highest court rejected the publicdisclosure tort.52 Today, twenty-first-century technologies magnify the
harm suffered by victims of these public disclosures. Technology has
made the publication of personal information easier and more
commonplace, and has exacerbated the emotional, reputational, economic,
and professional injuries associated with the unwanted publication of
private information.
In 1988, when Hall was decided, publications were made by
professional media sources, and news was spread primarily by word of
mouth, telephone, newspaper, or television.
News or publishing
intermediaries “played an important social role in balancing the
newsworthiness of information against the privacy interests of third parties
who were identified.”53 Today, Internet technologies have provided a
freely”); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1954)
(declining to extend a statutory provision for commercial misappropriation to allow a claim
of misappropriation of an entertainer’s life story in a movie). The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island rejected the privacy tort in 1909. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 109 (R.I.
1909). However, as mentioned above, that decision was superseded by a statute that granted
a cause of action for all four branches of the privacy tort. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1
(2012); see also Lucy Noble Inman, Note, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of
Invasion of Privacy by Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1474,
1487 n.131 (1989).
49. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (expressly resolving government
sanctions of true information only as it arose “in a discrete factual context”).
50. Id. at 533.
51. See Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977); Doe v. Methodist
Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997); Brunson, 73 N.W.2d at 806–07 (deferring to the
legislature to decide whether a private-facts claim should be recognized); Howell v. N.Y.
Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging, however, that New York
recognizes a statutory right to privacy); see also supra note 27.
52. In 1995, only about 10% of adults used the Internet. Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron
Smith, Digital Differences, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2012/04/13/digital-differences/.
53. Id.
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“technological megaphone” that individuals can use to “broadcast their
story [and those of others] to the world.”54
Use of technology and social media is growing. Internet use among
American adults from 1995 to 2014 has increased from 14% to 87%.55
Today, Facebook has over 1.44 billion monthly active users and 936
million daily active users, with 161 million daily active users in the United
States and Canada alone.56 Facebook users have uploaded over 250 billion
photos, and average 4.5 billion “likes” each day.57 There are 302 million
monthly active Twitter users, with 500 million Tweets sent per day.58
Further, a majority of Americans now own smartphones that provide
instant access to the Internet and social media.59
The growth of revenge porn in the United States is directly related to
the growth in technology and the use of social media. This has, in turn,
created a need for legal remedies to address digital injuries. The publicdisclosure tort provides a civil remedy to address these injuries.60
II. NORTH CAROLINA’S GAP IN PRIVACY PROTECTION
The Court’s decision in Hall v. Post has created a gap in privacy
protection in North Carolina that is increasingly problematic with the rise
of revenge porn and other digital injuries. This Part highlights the gap in
protection by examining how the various civil remedies available to
citizens of North Carolina fail to adequately redress the publication of
private images commonly associated with revenge porn.

54. Id.
55. Internet Use Over Time, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/
internet-use/internet-use-over-time/ (last visited May 11, 2015).
56. Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 200+ Amazing Facebook User Statistics, DMR (last
updated May 11, 2015), http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/by-the-numbers-17amazing-facebook-stats/#.VDV03fl4pcQ.
57. Id.
58. About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited May 11, 2015).
From 2011 to 2013 alone, Twitter acquired 280 million active users—an increase of 40%.
TJ McCue, Twitter Ranked Fastest Growing Social Platform in the World, FORBES (Jan. 29,
2013, 4:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/01/29/twitter-ranked-fastestgrowing-social-platform-in-the-world/.
59. Aaron Smith, Nearly Half of American Adults Are Smartphone Owners, PEW RES.
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Smartphone-Update-2012.
aspx.
60. See Chander, supra note 30, at 129–33 (arguing that the public-disclosure tort is the
best legal remedy to address the rise of revenge porn).
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A. Privacy Torts
Privacy torts could provide revenge-porn victims with valuable civil
remedies against the individual who publishes their private images, but
privacy torts are not fully recognized in North Carolina.61
Privacy torts grew out of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s
famous 1890 article, The Right to Privacy.62 Warren and Brandeis believed
that privacy had become more essential to individuals because the press of
their day was subjecting individuals to “mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”63 By synthesizing
cases in which relief had been granted “on the basis of defamation, or the
invasion of some property right, or a breach of confidence or an implied
contract,”64 they concluded that these decisions were based on a distinct
right to privacy, deserving of its own “separate recognition.”65 They
wanted the law to adapt to the needs of society, recognizing that the
strength of our legal system lies in its adaptability, capacity for growth, and
ability “to meet the wants of an ever changing society and to apply
immediate relief for every recognized wrong.”66
In subsequent decades, courts were divided over recognition of
Warren and Brandeis’s right to privacy. With the publication of the
Restatement of Torts in 1939, however, the momentum substantially shifted
in favor of recognizing privacy rights.67
After Warren and Brandeis introduced the vague notion of the right to
privacy, William Prosser organized the idea into a classification of four
torts.68 Prosser asserted that the four privacy torts—intrusion, false light,
appropriation, and public disclosure of private facts—shared very little

61. See Burgess v. Busby, 544 S.E.2d 4, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (indicating that North
Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy by disclosure of
private facts or false light); accord Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 588 S.E.2d
20, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
62. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
63. Id. at 196.
64. Prosser, supra note 1, at 384 (citations omitted) (discussing Warren and Brandeis’s
article).
65. Id.
66. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 213 n.1.
67. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
68. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 149 (2007).
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apart from an interference with a plaintiff’s right “to be let alone,” because
each tort protected a different interest of the plaintiff.69
North Carolina narrowly recognizes only two of the four privacy torts:
appropriation and intrusion upon seclusion.70 Neither of these two privacy
torts is adequate to address the injuries of revenge-porn victims in the state.
1.

Intrusion Upon Seclusion

Intrusion is ill suited for addressing most injuries resulting from
revenge porn.71 The claim of intrusion protects against the acquisition of
private information when one intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns” if the intrusion is “highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”72 Intrusion protects against the invasion
of one’s private, physical space and from methods of wiretapping and
eavesdropping.73 The plaintiff’s interest protected by intrusion, Prosser
argued, was primarily a “mental one” that had been useful for filling the
gaps between trespass, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and other constitutional remedies.74
The classic case of intrusion involves the “Peeping Tom,” who
records or views someone in a private place without that person’s
knowledge. In Hamberger v. Eastman,75 for example, the court concluded
that a couple had a valid intrusion claim against their landlord for his
installation of a hidden recording device in their bedroom.76

69. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389. This phrase was originally coined by Judge Cooley
and used by Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 62, at 95.
70. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging
that North Carolina has recognized the privacy torts of appropriation and intrusion upon
seclusion). But see Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 713 (rejecting the tort of public disclosure of private
facts in 1988); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984)
(rejecting the false-light tort in 1984).
71. See Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 588 S.E.2d 20, 27–28 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003) (indicating that there must be a physical or sensory intrusion or an unauthorized
prying into confidential personal records to support a claim for invasion of privacy by
intrusion).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
73. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389–92.
74. Id. at 392.
75. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
76. Id. at 241–42; see also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1431 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(finding media surveillance of a couple’s activities in their home to be actionable under an
intrusion tort theory); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931) (holding that
wiretapping a person’s phone gives rise to a tort action because it violates his right “to the
privacy of his home as against the unwarranted invasion of others”).
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Intrusion, by definition, does not protect anyone who consents to the
initial acquisition of his or her private information, even if that information
is later disclosed to the public without the person’s consent. This presents
a legal barrier for most revenge-porn victims, the majority of whom
consensually give private images to a boyfriend or girlfriend, trusting that
those images will be kept private. Victims of revenge porn are injured
when those images are subsequently disclosed to a broader audience
without their permission. Thus, intrusion does not protect revenge-porn
victims like Holly Jacobs, and it would not protect the North Carolina
teenagers harmed by the recent disclosure of their private images if those
teenagers initially gave those images to a boyfriend or girlfriend in trust.77
2.

Appropriation of One’s Name or Likeness

Because of North Carolina’s narrow interpretation of the appropriation
tort, it, too, is ill suited as a remedy for victims of revenge porn. In
Prosser’s view, appropriation was unlike the other three privacy torts in
that it protected the plaintiff’s proprietary interest in his or her identity—a
plaintiff’s “name or likeness.”78 As appropriation has developed, courts
have taken two distinct views on what the tort protects.79 The first view,
which was also adopted by Prosser, is that appropriation protects a property
right.80 This view has been more widely adopted.81 The second view is
that appropriation protects against embarrassment or loss of dignity.82
77. Intrusion could be a remedy for any of the North Carolina teenagers whose accounts
were hacked and who had not disclosed images to someone in trust. But see Rowan Co.
Student, supra note 13 (highlighting that some of the victims initially shared these images
with boyfriends or girlfriends before they were disclosed on Instagram and Twitter).
78. Prosser, supra note 1, at 406.
79. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 663–70 (1991) (contrasting the “property” and
“dignity” rationales that underlie the tort of appropriation).
80. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 223–24 (1999).
Some states have adopted a new tort known as the “right of publicity” to redress violations
of property rights to one’s name or likeness. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.63, at 544–45 (2d ed. 2014) (“Simplistically put, while the
appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right
of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook.”).
81. See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 109–14 (2003) (arguing that
Prosser’s characterization of appropriation as vindicating property interests obscured the
dignitary interests that the tort protected, noting that “[m]odern courts are prone to
subsuming the privacy claim under the label of publicity”).
82. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 986–89 (1964).
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North Carolina has adopted a narrow interpretation of the first view,83
allowing recovery only in situations where the defendant uses the
plaintiff’s name or likeness for advertising or commercial purposes.84
Thus, any disclosures of sexual photographs that are not made for
advertising or commercial purposes would not fall within North Carolina’s
definition of appropriation. This approach is problematic for victims of
revenge porn, whose images or videos are typically published to cause
harm or embarrassment, not for some advertising or commercial use.85
B. Other Common-Law Remedies
North Carolina common law provides some narrow categorical
protections against the disclosure of confidential medical information
through medical-malpractice actions;86 and, where a fiduciary duty exists,
North Carolina allows plaintiffs to recover for the breach of a fiduciary
duty.87 These categorical protections, however, do nothing for revengeporn victims, because their injuries do not involve the disclosure of medical
information or the existence of a fiduciary duty.

83. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes a broader approach to appropriation,
allowing for recovery where the defendant appropriates the plaintiff’s name or likeness for
her own “use or benefit.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
84. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 64 (N.C. 1938) (concluding that
the unauthorized use of one’s photograph in connection with an advertisement or other
commercial purpose gives rise to a cause of action for appropriation); Merritt, Flebotte,
Wilson, Webb & Caruso, PLLC v. Hemmings, 676 S.E.2d 79, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(noting that the defendant must show that the misappropriation was made for commercial
purposes (citing Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05C5488,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29082, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2006), aff’d, 471 F.3d 745 (7th Cir.
2006))).
85. See William K. Smith, Saving Face: Adopting a Right of Publicity to Protect North
Carolinians in an Increasingly Digital World, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2065, 2098 n.227 (2014)
(discussing how this lack of protection is increasingly problematic as cyberbullying and
revenge porn become more commonplace).
86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2013) (“Confidential information obtained in medical
records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient. . . .”); see also Watts v.
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. 330 S.E.2d 242, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Mazza
v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837–38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)), rev’d in part on other grounds,
345 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. 1986).
87. See White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147, 155–56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(explaining that breach of fiduciary duty is a recognized tort in North Carolina that requires
the existence of a fiduciary relationship (citing Abbitt v. Gregory, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (N.C.
1931))).
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North Carolina recognizes defamation as a cause of action, but the tort
covers only the publication of false information, not true facts.88 Since
images or videos of victims of revenge porn are true images, defamation is
not an appropriate claim. Defamation protects an important reputational
interest, but it does not protect the vast amounts of true, private information
that, when disclosed to the public, can be extremely harmful as well.
Contrary to the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s assessment in
Hall, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)89 does not serve as
an adequate proxy for public disclosure of private facts for victims of
revenge porn. To state a prima facie cause of action for IIED in North
Carolina, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional
distress to another.90
North Carolina’s interpretation of these elements makes it difficult for
revenge-porn victims to find relief under the tort of IIED. First, the
revenge-porn victim must prove that the defendant’s publication of the
media constitutes “extreme and outrageous conduct.”91 In North Carolina,
conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds usually
tolerated by a decent society92 or shocks the conscience.93 Liability does
not extend to mere insults, indignities, or threats.94 Comparably, public
disclosure of private facts generally requires only proof that the defendant
(1) published private facts (2) that would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. The conduct threshold for IIED is therefore higher than

88. Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 587–88 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a
statement’s truth is an absolute defense to a libel claim (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Wake Stone Corp., 432 S.E.2d 428, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d per curiam, 453 S.E.2d
146 (N.C. 1995))).
89. See Shreve v. Duke Power Co., 354 S.E.2d 357, 359 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (defining
IIED under North Carolina law).
90. Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (N.C. 1981).
91. See, e.g., Ausley v. Bishop, 515 S.E.2d 72, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that
the claimant’s burden in demonstrating extreme and outrageous conduct is high); Shreve,
354 S.E.2d at 359–60 (finding that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of
extreme and outrageous).
92. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Phillips v.
Rest. Mgmt. of Carolina, L.P., 552 S.E.2d 686, 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Shreve,
354 S.E.2d at 359).
93. See, e.g., Dunn v. Mosley, No. 4:10-CV-28-FL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65279, at
*16 (E.D.N.C. June 16, 2011) (citing Russ v. Causey, 732 F. Supp. 2d 589, 607 (E.D.N.C.
2010), aff’d in part, 468 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012)).
94. See, e.g., McEntire v. Johnson, No. 1:12cv327, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151482, at
*7–8 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2013) (citing Guthrie, 567 S.E.2d at 408–09).
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the public-disclosure tort, making it more difficult for a victim of revenge
porn to recover under IIED.
In addition, a plaintiff must prove that the extreme and outrageous
conduct caused her “severe emotional distress.”95 In North Carolina, this is
defined as “neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other
type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.”96
Temporary fright, disappointment, or regret will not satisfy this element,
nor will feelings of fear, embarrassment, and humiliation.97 Therefore,
even if a victim can prove extreme and outrageous conduct, she may fail to
meet the high threshold of proving severe emotional distress. Many
victims of revenge porn may suffer only from embarrassment and
humiliation, which would not satisfy this element. Conversely, disclosure
of private information can cause other types of harm—such as financial or
professional harm—that may not be adequately addressed by IIED.98 The
efficacy of public disclosure of private facts is that it specifically deters the
disclosure of private information; IIED is not specifically designed to deter
this behavior.
Moreover, no public figure can recover for IIED that arises out of a
publication without proving falsity.99 Thus, no matter how offensive or
harmful the disclosure, a public figure will never recover for IIED if the
information disclosed is true, which will nearly always be the case for
victims of revenge porn.
The common-law remedies available to victims of revenge porn are
inadequate in North Carolina, and the state’s limited recognition of privacy
torts leaves victims with no common-law remedy to address their injuries.

95. Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (quoting Dickens, 276 S.E.2d at
335).
96. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d
85, 97 (N.C. 1990)).
97. Payne v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (E.D.N.C. 2011)
(quoting Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828, 837–38 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993)), aff’d, 471 F. App’x 186 (4th Cir. 2012).
98. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1815–16 (2010) (discussing the financial and economic damages that can result from the
unwanted disclosure of private information).
99. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
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C. Other Statutory Remedies
Civil remedies available by statute in North Carolina also fall short of
addressing injuries caused by revenge porn.100 North Carolina’s categorical
approach to addressing issues related to individual privacy leaves gaps in
protection for revenge-porn victims.
Several federal and state statutes limit disclosure of personal data.
Federal statutes restrict disclosure of information from school records,101
cable company records,102 video rental or sale records,103 driving records,104
and health records.105 In addition, the Fair Credit Reporting Act places
limitations on consumer reporting agencies’ disclosures of consumer
reports.106
Many states also provide statutory privacy protections against the
disclosure of personal information. Thirty states have statutes that prohibit
the disclosure of identifying information concerning victims of sexual
crimes.107 Forty-one states restrict the disclosure of identifying information
regarding an individual’s HIV or AIDS status.108 North Carolina does not
have statutes addressing the victims of sexual crimes or disclosure of
information regarding HIV or AIDS. North Carolina does, however, have
a statute that protects against the disclosure of some personal information
where the person has previously objected to the disclosure of that
information. 109
North Carolina applies what one author has called the “Stratified
Model” to statutory privacy protections,110 basing the degree of protection

100. But see supra note 16 (discussing proposed legislation that would cover many of the
injuries associated with revenge porn).
101. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b) (2012).
102. Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c).
103. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711.
104. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725.
105. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
106. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3).
107. For a full list of these statutes, see Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s
Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 433 n.40
(1996).
108. See id. at 434 n.41.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-66 (2013).
110. See Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal
Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J.
1185, 1191–92 (1992).
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on the content of the information.111 As such, North Carolina limits the
disclosure of information obtained through the collection of taxes on
controlled substances112 and privileged patient medical records.113 North
Carolina also prohibits employment discrimination against anyone testing
positive for AIDS,114 and the disclosure of “trade secrets.”115 Indeed, these
categorical protections are important, but they protect only against
disclosures by government agencies and only the types of information
listed in the statutes, leaving a wide gap that does not protect against the
disclosure of nude or sexual images.
On the criminal side, North Carolina provides little protection against
the public disclosure of private information.
North Carolina has
surprisingly robust—some argue, unconstitutional116—protections against
cyberbullying,117 where students are prohibited from making even true
statements, if those statements might provoke a third party to “stalk or
harass a school employee.”118 North Carolina’s cyberbullying statutes,
however, only protect teachers and students, and there is no evidence of
any prosecutions under these statutes. North Carolina does prohibit
identity theft,119 but the law’s focus is on punishing the conduct of stealing
one’s identity, not deterring those who may have disclosed personal
information to the identity thief. Further, criminal laws generally focus on
vindicating the state’s interests in deterring crime,120 not on making “the
injured person whole.”121
In sum, although North Carolina has many common-law and statutory
remedies, there is no legal protection that directly addresses the harm that
111. Id. at 1191.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.112.
113. Id. § 130A-12.
114. Id. § 130A-148(i).
115. Id. § 132-1.2; see also id. § 66-152 (defining trade secrets).
116. See James L. Seay III, Comment, Salvaging the North Carolina TeacherCyberbullying Statute, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 391, 397–411 (2015) (arguing that portions of
the state’s cyberbullying statutes violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Olivia A.
Weil, Note, Preserving the Schoolhouse Gates: An Analytical Framework For Curtailing
Cyberbullying Without Eroding Students’ Constitutional Rights, 11 AVE MARIA L. REV. 541,
559 (2013) (acknowledging that the law is subject to attacks grounded in the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-458.1 to .2.
118. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2).
119. Although North Carolina does not specifically punish the disclosure of information
to an identity thief, the offender could be charged with identity theft in certain
circumstances. See id. § 14-113.20.
120. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 6 (2d ed. 2011).
121. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 717 N.W.2d 258, 273 (Wis. 2006).
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results from revenge porn in a way that fully replaces the public-disclosure
tort.
III. BRINGING THE PUBLIC-DISCLOSURE TORT ONLINE IN
NORTH CAROLINA
Recognizing a cause of action for the public disclosure of private facts
in North Carolina will offer victims of revenge porn a civil remedy for the
unauthorized publication of their private images. Of the four privacy torts,
the public-disclosure tort most closely addresses “the interest that
motivated Warren and Brandeis to write their article,” because it targets the
unwanted disclosure of private information.122 Warren and Brandeis were
primarily concerned with the press invading the private lives of individuals
and publishing private information with newspapers and new technology,
such as “instantaneous photographs” and “mechanical devices,” to feed
what they perceived to be society’s “prurient taste.”123 They argued that
the common law’s “beautiful capacity for growth” allowed judges to
respond to gaps in legal protection,124 and, as the “press [was] overstepping
in every direction the obvious bound of propriety and of decency,” Warren
and Brandeis believed that the common law should provide a remedy to
protect individuals’ privacy interests.125
Recognizing the public-disclosure tort would give victims of revenge
porn a civil remedy for the harm caused by those disclosures. North
Carolina can either judicially126 or legislatively127 bring the publicdisclosure tort back to life. Either way, the essence of the tort should
provide that a plaintiff states a prima facie cause of action for the public
disclosure of private facts if she proves each of the following elements:

122. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The “New” Privacy and the “Old”: Is Applying the
Tort Law of Privacy Like Putting High-Button Shoes on the Internet?, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y
107, 112 (2012) [hereinafter Zimmerman, New Privacy].
123. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 195–96.
124. Id. at 195.
125. Id. at 196–97.
126. Given the opportunity, the Supreme Court of North Carolina can reverse the Hall
decision and recognize the tort of public disclosure of private facts. The court could justify
this decision by acknowledging the increasing need for privacy protection in the digital age
to address injuries from actions like publishing revenge porn—a need that was not foreseen
in 1988 when Hall was decided.
127. A second method to bring the public-disclosure tort to life in North Carolina is for
the General Assembly to draft a civil statute granting the same protection.
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(1) The defendant published information about the plaintiff;
(2) Before this disclosure, the information was private (i.e., not
known to the public);
(3) The publication of this information would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; and
(4) The information published was not of legitimate public
concern.128
When broken down, the tort requires proof of four distinct elements:
(1) publicity, (2) private facts, (3) offensiveness, and (4) lack of a
legitimate public concern.129 Each of these elements leaves some room for
interpretation and flexibility,130 making public disclosure of private facts
adaptable to changes in social norms and useful for addressing harms in the
digital age. This Part explains each of the elements and provides
recommendations on how North Carolina should interpret and apply these
elements to injuries like revenge porn in the digital age.
A. Publicity
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant published private
information about the plaintiff. To address this element, North Carolina
should adopt a flexible approach that accounts for the rapid dissemination
of information made possible by the Internet. North Carolina ought to
avoid the traditional view of “publicity,” which forecloses recovery in
cases where information is disclosed to a small group of people, when that
information is disclosed online.
Most states require the plaintiff to show that her private information
was communicated to the “public at large, or to so many persons that the
matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge.”131 In these states, it is not necessary for everyone in that

128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
129. See id. § 652D cmts. b, d (addressing both private matters and matters of legitimate
public concern).
130. See Jaime A. Madell, Note, The Poster’s Plight: Bringing the Public Disclosure
Tort Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 895, 916 (2011).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (explaining the publicity element
of the public-disclosure tort).
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broad audience to recognize the person involved or to understand the
significance of the disclosure.132
Traditionally, the publicity element was not satisfied when
information was disclosed to a single person, or even to a small group.133
However, at least one court has found the use of e-mail to send sexually
explicit photographs to a small number of family and friends to raise an
issue of material fact as to whether the publicity element had been satisfied,
acknowledging that the publicity element may be satisfied even when
communicated to a small group if the information is sent over the Internet,
because of the ease with which that information can be further
disseminated.134 That court’s approach is effective in the digital age
because it acknowledges how publications are more easily made on the
Internet. To address the “publicity” element in the digital age, courts
should examine how easily the information can be further disseminated.
Under this approach, information shared online, even to a small group, will
likely satisfy the “publicity” element because it is so easily shared.
It is now almost universally recognized that publication can be made
through any medium.
This includes, but is not limited to, oral
communications,135 radio broadcasts,136 movies,137 television,138 and
photographs.139 Because courts have found these types of mediums
sufficient to satisfy the publication element, any disclosures made by mass
media, online social-networking sites, blogs, or mass e-mail should also be
sufficient, since they can reach large audiences instantaneously.

132. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492
A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) (noting that the plaintiff was harmed when her image was
broadcast on television in connection with her plastic surgery, even though her name was
not mentioned and many viewers likely did not recognize her).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.
134. Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633, at *5–7
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009).
135. See, e.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District
of Columbia law); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884–85 (S.D. Ga.
1983) (applying Georgia law).
136. See, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 845–46 (N.D. Cal. 1939);
Wilson v. Grant, 687 A.2d 1009, 1015 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
137. See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1341 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (applying Florida law), aff’d, 425 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2005).
138. See, e.g., Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123–24 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(applying California law).
139. See, e.g., McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477 (Ala.
1964); Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
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B. Private Facts
Second, a plaintiff must prove that information published by the
defendant constitutes “private facts.” For this element, North Carolina
should adopt an approach that recognizes that information is often
disclosed to several trusted confidants with the expectation that the
information will not be disseminated further.
Instead of viewing
information disclosed to trusted individuals as now being public and
therefore insufficient to meet the standard of “private facts,” courts ought
to examine whether the information has been shared beyond these
boundaries before finding that the information qualifies as “public.”
The public-disclosure tort is designed to protect information that is
truly private.140 Thus, there is no liability where the defendant merely
gives further publicity to information that is already in the public record.141
For example, publicity about the plaintiff’s date of birth, fact of marriage,
military record, or a pleading filed in a lawsuit is not a private fact as a
matter of law and is not actionable.142
The Supreme Court of the United States validated the constitutionality
of the public-records exception in 1975 in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn.143 That case involved the father of a deceased rape victim who sued
a broadcasting company because its reporter disclosed his daughter’s name
during a report of the alleged rapist’s trial.144 The Court held that a state
may not constitutionally impose sanctions for the accurate publication of a
rape victim’s name obtained from the official court records when the
records are maintained in connection with a criminal prosecution and are
open to public inspection.145 In doing so, the Court reinforced the publicrecords exception and emphasized that it does not matter whether the
information is easily obtainable.146 However, “if the record is one not open
to public inspection, [such as] income tax returns, it is not [considered]
public, and there is an invasion of privacy when it is made so.”147
The tort of public disclosure of private facts is premised on the idea
that there are certain phases of a person’s life that he or she only wants
revealed to those entrusted with that information.148 A few facts that have
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Id.
Id. § 652D cmt. b.
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476 (1975).
Id. at 474.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 496.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b.
Id.
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been deemed private for purposes of this tort include financial
information,149 debts,150 intimate parts of anatomy,151 sexual habits,152 and
gender corrective surgery.153
When addressing this element, the court should first address the
public-records exception, as outlined in Cox Broadcasting. Information
that is available in the public record should not satisfy the element of
“private facts.” Second, the court should examine whether the information
is being disclosed beyond “existing networks of information flow.”154
Courts must not view “private facts” as a binary, all-or-nothing concept.
Rather, courts ought to recognize degrees of privacy, a concept known as
“limited privacy,”155 and not equate what is “secret” with what is

149. See, e.g., Yee Keung Siu v. Pius Lee, No. A116191, 2007 WL 2956360, at *7 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007) (holding that the disclosure of “highly sensitive private financial
information” amounted to a public disclosure of private facts); Mason v. Williams Disc.
Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838–39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a “no checks” sign
regarding the plaintiffs “interfered with [their] right to be let alone”).
150. See, e.g., Challen v. Town & Country Charge, 545 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (applying Ohio and Illinois law); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708,
709 (Ky. 1941).
151. See, e.g., Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1939) (holding that publishing x-rays of a woman’s pelvic region violated her right to
privacy); Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (alleging that
a newspaper published a mother’s statements to her dead son and photographs showing her
son’s body in the hospital); see also Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178,
181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (deciding that the plaintiff’s claim “that Sprint employees
asked for her password and, upon accessing her e-mail account, obtained and disseminated
personal photographs of her body to third persons via the internet” was arbitrable under a
cellular telephone service agreement).
152. See, e.g., Nat’l Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748, 749 n.1 (Tex. App.
1983), abrogated on other grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994);
see also Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 827 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In
Michaels, the court found that a famous rock star’s and actress’s privacy rights were
violated by the distribution of videos of the couple engaging in sexual intercourse, even
though the actress routinely portrayed sexy characters, and even though another tape of her
having sex with her husband had previously been distributed. Id. Similarly, the degree to
which the rock star opened his life to the public did not extend to the publicizing of his
sexual acts. Id.
153. See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Ct. App. 1983).
154. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 535 (2006)
[hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy]; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory
of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 974 (2005) (arguing that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy where there is a low risk that the information will spread beyond the
individual’s social network).
155. Strahilevitz, supra note 154, at 939.
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Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach157 illustrates the
“private.”156
concept of “limited privacy.” Kubach was an HIV-positive man who had
disclosed his HIV diagnosis to his family and to “friends, medical
personnel and members of his AIDS support group.”158 He agreed to
appear on a local television broadcast to discuss AIDS, and as a condition
for doing the interview, he was assured that his face would not be visible
on television.159 Kubach sued the station upon discovering that his face
was visible to viewers during the interview, and the station’s defense was
that Kubach had previously disclosed to others that he was HIV-positive.160
The court disagreed, finding that Kubach had disclosed this information to
people who “cared about him . . . or because they also had AIDS.” 161
Courts in North Carolina should adopt this approach of “limited
privacy.” The ultimate question in this analysis is whether information is
confined within expected boundaries of privacy. In the case of Kubach,
this meant that information was confined to those he trusted and was
therefore still private. The concept of limited privacy allows victims of
revenge porn a greater chance at recovery. Such victims initially share
their information with one individual, but, to them, the information is still
private. They have a reasonable expectation that it will not be shared
beyond the trusted individual. Without that reasonable expectation of
privacy, they would not have shared the information in the first place.
Under this approach, if the trusted individual subsequently disclosed the
information, he or she would be disclosing “private facts” under the publicdisclosure tort.
C. Offensiveness
The third element that a plaintiff must prove is that the disclosure of
private information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. For
this element, North Carolina should recognize the severity and permanence
of harm associated with publications made online, effectively lowering the
burden of proof for online injuries.

156. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Ct. App. 2001) (“But the
claim of a right of privacy is not ‘so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define
one’s circle of intimacy—to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.’” (quoting
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (1994))).
157. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
158. Id. at 494.
159. Id. at 493.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 494.
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To satisfy the “offensiveness” element in most states, the plaintiff
must show that the disclosure of his or her “private facts” would be
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.162 The disclosure must
be the type that would bring shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities, not the hypersensitive.163 What qualifies as highly offensive is
ultimately a normative judgment made by the jury based on the customs
and values of society.164
Because of the permanency and embarrassment of having nude or
sexual images or videos shared online, courts in North Carolina should
presume offensiveness when the disclosure involves nude or sexual images
of the plaintiff.165 This burden shifting would give victims of harmful
online disclosures a greater chance to recover.166 As information-privacy
and cyber-law scholar Danielle Citron argues, this would not be novel,
because the law already takes a similar approach in the defamation context:
defamation “has recognized that the longevity of damaging information
deepens its destructive power.”167 To this end, defamation law gives
greater protection to defamation in writing (libel claims) than to defamation
through the spoken word (slander claims).168
D. Legitimate Public Concern or Newsworthiness
For the fourth element, the plaintiff must prove that the information
disclosed was “not of legitimate public concern” or “newsworthy.”169 This
element serves as an internal protection against legal action that might
infringe on the First Amendment.170 Here, courts must carefully balance
the defendant’s First Amendment rights with the plaintiff’s right to

162. See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007); Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette
Publ’g Co., 297 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Nation v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 158 P.3d
953, 964 (Idaho 2007); Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 291 (Miss.
2007).
163. See, e.g., Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
165. See Citron, supra note 98, at 1851 (recommending that courts employ this type of
approach to address injuries that occur online).
166. Id. at 1850.
167. Id. at 1851.
168. Id.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d.
170. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 300 n.34 (1983) [hereinafter
Zimmerman, Requiem] (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga.
1905)).
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privacy.171 This balancing allows courts to protect the “free flow of ideas
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern,”172 while also
protecting important privacy interests.
Courts and commentators have adopted a number of approaches for
analyzing newsworthiness.173 This Subpart briefly explains each approach,
concluding with a recommendation that North Carolina adopt the
“California approach,” which involves a factor-balancing test with three
distinct factors for determining newsworthiness.174
1.

Defer-to-the-Media Approach

The first approach adopted by some courts to analyze newsworthiness
is to defer to the media to determine what is newsworthy.175 This approach,
also known as the “leave it to the press” model, presumes that information
published by the media is inherently newsworthy.176 This method relies on
media self-censorship and consumer demand to limit what is deemed
newsworthy.
Courts that have adopted this formulation make no
distinction between news as information and news as entertainment.177 This

171. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); Gilbert v. Med.
Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128
(9th Cir. 1975).
172. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1998); see also Hall v. Post,
372 S.E.2d 711, 720 (N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring) (explaining that the chilling effect is
minimized if the question of whether the published matter is of a legitimate public concern
is initially a question of law for the trial court).
173. See Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort,
85 KY. L.J. 147, 157–64 (1997) (describing five approaches used by courts to address the
issue of newsworthiness). Daniel Solove offers a different categorization in his article on
the public-disclosure tort and the First Amendment. See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1001
(2003) [hereinafter Solove, Virtues] (presenting three approaches: (1) deferring to the
media; (2) focusing on the status of the individual; and (3) examining the nature of the
information).
174. California’s test for newsworthiness involves balancing three factors: (1) the social
value of the information, (2) the extent of the intrusion into private areas, and (3) the extent
to which the complaining party has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye. See
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971), overruled on other grounds
by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004).
175. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 410–11 (7th Cir. 1962);
Jenkins v. Dell Publ’g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451–52 (3d Cir. 1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960–61 (D. Minn. 1948).
176. Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 170, at 353.
177. See, e.g., Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451–52 (holding that there is no need to determine
whether publication is for entertainment or information in order to render it “newsworthy”);
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approach effectively swallows the entire cause of action.178 “Public concern”
becomes synonymous with “public interest,” leaving very few areas of an
individual’s private life off limits.179
This model is also ill suited for the digital age because it does not
address the many disclosures made by non-media defendants. Any
individual with an Internet connection can publish information online, and
many of the most harmful disclosures are made by non-media individuals.
Because almost all items are considered newsworthy, the primary
advantage of this approach is that it does not risk infringing on the First
Amendment. However, it does so at the expense of protecting privacy.
Indeed, the only real difference between a jurisdiction that recognizes this
approach and a jurisdiction, like North Carolina, that does not recognize the
public-disclosure tort is formal recognition of the tort.180
Moving forward, North Carolina should refrain from adopting this
problematic deference to the media. Not only is this approach ineffective
at defining what information is of public concern and addressing online
disclosures, but it also undermines the viability of the public-disclosure
tort,181 making it nearly impossible for victims of revenge porn to find
protection.
2.

Restatement Approach

A second model for analyzing newsworthiness is outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement model states that “when
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for
its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he had no concern,” information ceases to be
newsworthy.182 This approach was first articulated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Virgil v. Time.183 In Virgil, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that newsworthiness should be a question of fact
for the jury184 and should be based on the localities’ community mores.185
McNutt v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 809 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it
is unnecessary to distinguish between entertainment and information).
178. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1003.
179. Id.
180. See Dendy, supra note 173, at 158.
181. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical
Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172–73 (2010) (describing why the
newsworthiness defense has all but swallowed the public-disclosure tort).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
183. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 1975).
184. Id.
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One unique aspect of this approach is the “decency limitation,”186 which
allows the jury to hold defendants liable for disclosures that it finds
newsworthy if the disclosure is “so intimate and so unwarranted in view of
the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency.”187
The Restatement approach strikes an effective balance between
privacy and the First Amendment through strict judicial scrutiny on the one
hand and jury determinations of newsworthiness and decency on the other.
Adopting a community-mores standard188 protects the First Amendment by
broadly defining what information is newsworthy. The decency limitation,
also based on community norms, is “not so vague that it will cause a
‘chilling effect’” on the First Amendment.189 And the judge takes “special
care”190 to scrutinize the evidence to determine whether the defendant
should prevail as a matter of law.191
3.

Nexus Approach

A third model that courts use to analyze newsworthiness joins a
“nexus” component to the Restatement test. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first articulated this approach in Campbell v.
Seabury Press.192 This approach extends greater protection to privacy by
adding a requirement that the information disclosed have a close nexus to a
matter of legitimate concern.193
The nexus approach involves a closer examination of the information
disclosed and its purported concern to the public. It acknowledges that
“not all aspects of the person’s life, and not everything the person says or
does, is thereby rendered newsworthy.”194 This approach recognizes the
need to strike a balance between free speech and individual privacy,
highlighting that there are areas of one’s life that may not bear any logical
relationship with some matter of legitimate public concern.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g.
186. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130.
187. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
188. This approach is similar to the United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment test
for obscenity used in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
189. Dendy, supra note 173, at 165.
190. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130.
191. Dendy, supra note 173, at 162.
192. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The
Tenth Circuit has also adopted this approach. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305,
308 (10th Cir. 1981) (explaining that a “newsworthy publication must have some substantial
relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest”).
193. See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Commc’ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989).
194. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal. 1998).
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Status-of-the-Plaintiff Approach

A fourth approach used by some courts to examine newsworthiness is
to focus on the status of the plaintiff.195 Under this model, what is of
legitimate public concern turns on whether the plaintiff qualifies as a public
figure or a private person.196 As in the defamation context, a plaintiff who
is a public figure loses at least part of his or her privacy,197 but there is
some disagreement over the extent of this loss. Some earlier cases held
that a public figure had no right to privacy at all,198 while more recent cases
suggest that there must be at least some rational relationship between the
information disclosed about the public figure and his or her public life.199
The rationale behind this rule is that public figures have greater access to
media outlets to advocate on their own behalf,200 and the public has a
greater interest in information that concerns those who have thrust
themselves into the public eye,201 or voluntarily entered the public
discourse.202
The value in the status-of-the-plaintiff approach is that there is often a
logical connection between the plaintiff’s status as a public figure or a
private person and whether the information disclosed is of public concern.
For example, information about public officials allows constituents to be
informed voters and hold elected officials accountable. Information about
a private person is less likely to be of legitimate public concern unless it
relates to the community at large.
This approach also has several flaws. One problem is that it treats all
information about public officials or public figures as being of public
concern.203 It is hard to argue that the social security numbers of public

195. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1008.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmts. e–g (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
197. Id.; see also O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941); Cason v.
Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947).
198. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Ct. App. 1962);
Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 212 (Ct. App. 1961).
199. See, e.g., Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
200. See Ali v. Daily News Publ’g Co., 540 F. Supp. 142, 144 (D.V.I. 1982); Warford v.
Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Ky. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580A cmt. b.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (explaining that one who
voluntarily places himself in the public eye—a voluntary public figure—cannot complain
when he is given publicity, even if the publicity is unfavorable).
202. See id. § 652D cmt. g (explaining that an involuntary public figure receives less
protection than a private person).
203. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1010.
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officials are of public concern.204 It is also difficult to contend that private,
sexual photos of a public figure are of legitimate public concern, especially
when the public figure has not previously disclosed them to the public.205
Another issue with this approach is that it lumps all public officials and
public figures into the same category. Public figures and public officials
are different, but defamation law treats them the same. Furthermore,
although the law of defamation makes no distinction, not all public officials
are the same and not all public figures are the same.206
5.

Nature-of-the-Information Approach

The fifth approach for determining newsworthiness focuses on the
nature of the information that is being disclosed.207 Under this narrow
approach, only information that contributes to “democratic self-governance” is
deemed to be of public concern.208 The nature-of-the-information approach
gives the most protection to privacy: disclosures that do not aid in political
discussion or debate are not of public concern.209 Some argue that this
approach overprotects privacy interests at the expense of free speech
because speech that is not related to political matters may still be of public
concern.210 Because the First Amendment protects more than just political
speech, this approach is too restrictive. But the opposite approach—
viewing all speech as newsworthy, regardless of its content—would be too
broad.
6.

California’s Approach

California has developed yet another test for newsworthiness,
incorporating many of the best models described above. This test involves
balancing (1) the social value of the information, (2) the depth of the
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and (3) the extent to which the
204. See id.
205. Some may argue with this contention, but even public figures should have privacy
rights in their own personal photographs. The recent publication of several celebrities’ nude
photos illustrates the need for protection. See Josh Margolin et al., FBI Is “Addressing”
Massive Celebrity Photo Hack, ABC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://abcnews.go.com
/Entertainment/fbi-addressing-massive-celebrity-photo-hack/story?id=25200140.
206. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1009–10.
207. Id. at 1010–11.
208. Id. at 1010.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1011–12 (discussing the flaws of this approach); see also Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1092–93 (2000) (discussing the
value of speech on “daily matters”).
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complaining party has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.211 The
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the information is not
newsworthy.212
Even if information is deemed newsworthy by the three-factor test, it
still may not qualify as newsworthy under California’s decency
limitation.213 To satisfy the decency limitation in California, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant disclosed the information with “reckless
disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly
offensive.”214 This additional fault requirement is intended to prevent any
“chilling effect” on the First Amendment.215 Finally, the California
approach tips the scales in favor of the First Amendment if there is an even
balance between a newsworthy disclosure and the decency limitation.216
California’s approach does the best job of balancing the interests of
privacy and free speech and providing clear instructions to the jury. The
three-factor analysis allows the courts to examine the nuances involved in
privacy injuries. Moreover, the decency limitation and the principle of
balancing in favor of free speech in cases of evenly weighted interests
provide a built-in protection of First Amendment freedoms.
7.

California’s Factor-Balancing as a Recommended Approach

North Carolina should adopt California’s factor-balancing approach
because it adequately protects both privacy and free speech without
sacrificing either interest. California law in this area is also one of the most
developed. Interest balancing is common in First Amendment
jurisprudence,217 and judicial consideration of multiple factors provides for
211. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971), overruled on other
grounds by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004).
212. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768–70 (Ct. App. 1983).
213. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 42–43.
214. Id. at 44.
215. Id. at 43.
216. Id.
217. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), Justice Frankfurter’s concurring
opinion suggested that balancing was not simply the best way, but the only way to evaluate
First Amendment claims:
Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to
the well-being of the country. . . . If adjudication is to be a rational process, we
cannot escape a candid examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition
that both are supported by weighty title-deeds.
Id. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter recognized that balancing tests
better reflected the complexities of the free-speech doctrine:
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions
would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic
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a nuanced approach that is adaptable to changes in the digital age.
Under the three-factor test, North Carolina courts should first analyze
the “social value” of the information published.218 Courts should give
information that contributes to “democratic self-governance” the most
protection because one of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is
to promote “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [debate] . . . on government
and public officials.”219 Similarly, as the Supreme Court of the United
States highlighted in the context of obscenity, information that has
“literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” should receive protection.220
Information that furthers one of these interests is more likely to be of public
concern because it furthers legitimate communal interests.
On the other side of the spectrum, intimate information pertaining to
health and sex should receive the least amount of protection unless it
relates to one of the interests discussed above.221 For example, a
newspaper that published a photograph of the plaintiff nude in a bathtub
was not newsworthy, since the publication imparted no legitimate
information to the public.222 Similarly, a picture of a high-school athlete
whose genitalia was accidentally exposed while playing soccer,223 or a
recording of two individuals having sex,224 should receive less First
Amendment protection.
Giving privacy protection to these areas
safeguards human dignity and decent behavior, which are indispensable
attributes of civil society.225
For the second and third factors, North Carolina courts should analyze
the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private affairs and the extent to
which the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position of public notoriety. This
society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian
problems to be solved.
Id. at 524–25.
218. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 34.
219. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
220. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (explaining the three-part test for
identifying obscenity).
221. Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court
Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 56–57 (1974) (noting that there is no
First Amendment right to “satisfy public curiosity and publish lurid gossip about private
lives”).
222. McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
223. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. App. 1991).
224. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
225. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 154, at 537.
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involves “a comparison between the information revealed and the nature of
the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.”226
Courts should pull from the law of defamation to conduct this
examination. The plaintiff will fall into one of four categories: (1) a public
official, (2) an all-purpose public figure, (3) a limited public figure, or (4) a
private person. Public officials are those “government employees who
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”227 An all-purpose public
figure is one who has “achieve[d] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”228 A limited
public figure is one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a
particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues.”229 Anyone who does not fall into one of these
three categories is de facto classified as a private person.
A plaintiff who qualifies as a private person will receive the most
privacy protection, and information disclosed about a private person is the
least likely to be deemed newsworthy. A plaintiff who qualifies as a public
official or public figure, whether all-purpose or limited, will receive less
privacy protection than a private person because information about him is
most likely to be of public concern. Most important in this analysis is how
the status of the plaintiff is relevant to the information disclosed.
Courts should then examine whether there is some nexus between the
matter ostensibly of public concern and the plaintiff’s private
information.230 Not all information disclosed about a public official or
public figure should be of public concern. Information related to the
character or qualifications of a public official, or information related to the
public figure’s public life, should be of public concern. But certain
information—social security numbers or private photos, for example—
should not qualify as a public concern.231 Similarly, not all information
about a public figure is related to that individual’s public life. A court
should ask whether there is a close nexus between the information
disclosed and the individual’s public life. If there is not a close nexus, the
court should give the same protection that it would give to a private person.
A plaintiff who qualifies as a private person should receive the greatest
226. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal. 1998).
227. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
228. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
229. Id.
230. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484.
231. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841–42 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (finding that the broadcast of a video recording of sexual relations between a famous
actress and a rock star was not a matter of legitimate public concern).
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amount of protection, because his or her information is the least likely to be
of public concern.232
Courts should examine each of these factors where it is appropriate,
and give each factor its necessary weight based on the context of each
unique case. No one factor is dispositive in this analysis, and courts should
balance the factors against the defendant’s right to free speech. In sum,
while this element accounts for the public’s right to know about
information of public concern, applied correctly, it should leave room to
protect the plaintiff’s private life.233
Adopting the public-disclosure tort in this manner will provide a
much-needed civil remedy for victims of revenge porn in North Carolina.
For example, a teenager involved in the recent North Carolina incident of
disclosure could bring a claim against the individual who published his or
her image on Instagram. The teenager would be able to prove all of the
elements required by the tort and would likely recover damages against the
publisher.
IV. OVERCOMING FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
Those who criticize the public-disclosure tort typically raise concerns
about its effect on free speech protected by the First Amendment.234
Despite scholarly criticism, the public-disclosure tort has continued to
expand across the nation,235 and many scholars defend the tort for its ability
to specifically address the harms caused by the disclosure of private
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining
that a plaintiff who is a private person does not have to prove the same level of fault as a
public official or a public figure in the context of defamation).
233. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 719 (N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring).
234. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of
Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 423 (2008) (arguing that civil liability
for disclosure is objectionable under the First Amendment because truthful speech should
not be censured); Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of
a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665 (1980) (arguing that erasing the disclosure tort
might be best because of its constitutional problems and because it gives courts the function
of deciding the weight and significance of true information about a plaintiff); Zimmerman,
Requiem, supra note 170, at 291 (arguing that the disclosure tort should be ended, as its
constitutional problems are overwhelming, and that if it does continue, the meaning of
private information and newsworthiness would have to be severely limited).
235. Jared A. Wilkerson, Battle for the Disclosure Tort, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 266–67
(2013) (noting the continued expansion of the public-disclosure tort, despite related
scholarly criticism); John A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort That Refuses to Go Away: The
Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 509
n.132, 510 n.139 (1999) (noting that from 1993 to 1999 alone, at least twenty-one plaintiffs
prevailed, while only eighteen had prevailed prior to 1980).
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information.236 Although the public-disclosure tort does implicate First
Amendment issues, North Carolina courts are capable of balancing First
Amendment interests against the interests of privacy.237 Accordingly,
North Carolina should not be deterred from adopting the public-disclosure
tort for fear of First Amendment concerns.
Prior to the 1960s, tort-based lawsuits were considered private state
actions that did not implicate First Amendment scrutiny.238 In 1964, the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan239 changed this, and tort law that placed restrictions on speech
became subject to constitutional scrutiny.240 Not long after New York
Times, the Supreme Court decided a line of cases that held that imposing
civil liability for speech would require a heightened standard of
constitutional scrutiny.241
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,242 the Supreme Court applied constitutional
scrutiny to the false-light tort.243 About a decade later, the Court first
addressed the public-disclosure tort in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.244
In Cox Broadcasting, the Court simply reiterated that it is unconstitutional
to find liability for truthful speech by the press where the information is
part of the public record.245 The Court declined to hold that the public
disclosure of private facts required proof of falsity, or that tort liability for
truthful speech is per se unconstitutional.246 With several opportunities to
declare the public-disclosure tort unconstitutional, the Court has declined to
236. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1025–28 (describing how the public-disclosure
tort can adapt to the digital age); Zimmerman, New Privacy, supra note 122, at 114 (arguing
that the balance struck between privacy torts and the First Amendment is sufficient to
address complicated privacy problems in the digital age).
237. See Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 719 (“I do not believe that the media should be given a
license to pry into the private lives of ordinary citizens and spread before the public highly
offensive but very private facts without any degree of accountability. Such is not required
by either the federal or state constitutions.”) (Frye, J., concurring).
238. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1658 (2009).
239. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
240. Id. at 277.
241. See Solove & Richards, supra note 238, at 1658–60 (discussing these cases).
242. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
243. Id. at 390–91 (holding that the “actual malice” standard in Sullivan also applied to
the tort of false light, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with “actual
malice” by either knowingly making a false statement or acting recklessly with regard to the
truth).
244. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495–96 (1975).
245. Id.
246. Id.; see also Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2005).
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do so, making it clear that each ruling has only applied to the specific facts
of each case.247
If anything, the Supreme Court has expanded its protection of privacy
interests. In Bartnicki v. Vopper,248 the Court recognized the possibility
that privacy could trump newsworthiness concerns in certain contexts.249
The Court partially struck down a provision in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act that made individuals liable for disclosing
information that they knew was obtained by an illegal wiretap.250 Justice
Breyer, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the laws must strike a
“reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing
consequences.”251 At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the case
presented a conflict between two “interests of the highest order—on the
one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information
concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual
privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.”252 The Court
emphasized that “the fear of public disclosure of private conversations
might well have a chilling effect on private speech,” acknowledging that
privacy laws also protect First Amendment freedoms.253
The Court implicitly endorsed the balancing of free speech and
privacy interests, reiterating that information of public concern tips the
scales in favor of free speech.254 A common criticism of the balancing
between these two interests is that the Constitution protects speech, not
privacy.255 But Justice Breyer asserts in Bartnicki that the conflict posed
between speech and privacy is a conflict between two rights of
constitutional stature.256 Given these two competing interests, Justice
247. See Chemerinsky, supra note 234, at 653–56 (describing the Supreme Court’s
narrow decision addressing disclosure of private, true information).
248. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
249. Id. at 532; see also Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and
Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1045–48 (2009).
250. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533–35.
251. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 517 (majority opinion).
253. Id. at 533.
254. Id. at 534 (“In these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance.”). In a concurring opinion, Justice
Breyer emphasized that the information published was of “unusual public concern” because
there was a threat of potential harm to others. Id. at 535–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
255. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 994–95.
256. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Rodney A. Smolla,
Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech,
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002) (noting the conflict between speech and privacy as
outlined in Bartnicki). In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court
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Breyer asserted, the Court must strike “the proper fit.”257
As the California approach demonstrates, striking “the proper fit” is a
product of strict judicial scrutiny of the evidence as a matter of law and
jury determinations based on an application of three factors. North
Carolina courts should empower the jury to analyze the newsworthiness of
a disclosure by examining the three factors, while giving the court the
discretion, as a matter of law, to decide how those three factors are
balanced against the defendant’s First Amendment rights.258 Moreover,
requiring the plaintiff to prove reckless disregard as to the offensiveness of
the publication provides additional protection to free speech. As the
California courts have done, when the two interests are evenly balanced,
the court should tip the scales in favor of the First Amendment to preserve
breathing room for free speech.
Indeed, North Carolina courts already must navigate the First
Amendment analysis in many areas where speech is involved, including in
the defamation and IIED contexts. The vast majority of states that
recognize the public-disclosure tort confront the First Amendment analysis
on a case-by-case basis rather than reject the tort entirely.259 Courts need
not decline recognition for fear of constitutional scrutiny; rather, they
should carefully balance the First Amendment and privacy interests to find
the proper fit in each case.
CONCLUSION
Adopting the public-disclosure tort in North Carolina will not only fill
existing privacy gaps, it will also deter harmful disclosures of private
information in the future. This tort offers the North Carolina teenagers who
were recently harmed by the publication of their private photographs a
meaningful remedy.260 As these types of injuries arising from the public
disclosure of true, but private, facts increase in the digital age, the tort of

recognized that the “right to privacy” based on substantive due process also encompassed
the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 598–99.
257. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997)).
258. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998) (finding
published information newsworthy as a matter of law); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 720
(N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring) (“[T]he chilling effect is minimized if the question of
whether the published material is of legitimate concern to the public is initially a question of
law for the trial court.”).
259. See supra note 27 (listing each state’s stance on the tort).
260. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
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public disclosure of private facts provides the best way to control the
spread of these injuries.
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